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Chapter 2
Do European fiscal rules induce a
bias in fiscal forecasts? Evidence
from the Stability and Growth
Pact∗
2.1 Introduction
In response to the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, European policy makers
have taken steps with the aim of improving fiscal governance. The Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP) has been reformed. Among others, the European Commission
(EC) now plays a more important role in enforcing the rules at the expense of the
more politically oriented European Council. As argued by, for example, De Haan
et al. (2013), this should make sanctions more credible.
With the tightening of fiscal rules and stricter European fiscal surveillance, the
∗This chapter has been published as Gilbert, N. and J. de Jong, 2017, Do European fiscal rules induce
a bias in fiscal forecasts? Evidence from the Stability and Growth Pact, Public Choice, Vol. 170(1),
pp. 1-32. We would like to thank Peter Keus, Paul Mul and Rob Vet for help in constructing the
dataset and Diederik Dicou, Peter van Els, Jakob de Haan, Jos Jansen, Cherry Muijsson, Andreas
Pick, Maarten van ’t Riet, William F. Shughart II, Wim Suyker, two anonymous referees, participants
of the 30th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association in Mannheim, participants of the
2015 ‘Dutch Economists’ Day’(Nederlandse Economendag) in Amsterdam, and seminar participants
at the Dutch central bank, for valuable comments and suggestions.
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10 Chapter 2
data used in monitoring adherence to the SGP further gain in importance. This holds
in particular for the European Economic Forecasts, prepared by the EC itself (EC,
2015). The EC traditionally presents its forecasts in spring and autumn.1 Of those,
the so-called Spring Forecasts offer a first view of whether countries live up to the
rules set out in the SGP. They serve as the benchmark against which the EC judges
the budget balances reported by individual member states (Leal et al., 2008).
Fiscal forecasts must however be interpreted with care. It is well-established that
national fiscal forecasts often suffer from politically motivated biases (Bohn, 2014).
Although forecasts by supranational institutions tend to perform better, they are not
completely free of such biases. A possible cause lies in the fact that those institutions
depend on information supplied by national governments (Merola and Pérez, 2013).
The EC, too, depends to a large extent on information conveyed to it by member
states (Von Hagen, 2010). Forecasts are largely constructed by EC country desk
officials (EC, 2015), who often consult nationals to obtain information and opinions
on forecast items. Those nationals, for instance from the central government, may
have incentives to be overly optimistic. In the European case, those incentives are
arguably strongest for countries with expected deficits above the critical value of 3%
of GDP as enshrined in the SGP. Those countries risk being subject to the enhanced
scrutiny of the Excessive Deficit Procedure and, in the case of euro area member
states, ultimately risk being fined.
In constructing its forecasts, the EC thus faces a trade-off. While making use
of the detailed information supplied by national agencies can improve forecast ac-
curacy, it could also cause the EC to absorb more of the bias potentially present
in national forecasts (see e.g. Merola and Pérez, 2013). To the extent that the EC
does not ignore national information sources completely, at least some nationally
induced bias will be present in its fiscal projections. Additionally, though this is less
clear-cut, a case could be made that it is not in the EC’s own interest to forecast
a breach of the European fiscal rules, since this could suggest that the governance
framework it oversees is ineffective. These observations raise doubts regarding the
accuracy of European fiscal forecasts, especially for countries with expected deficits
1Since 2007 these have been supplemented by interim forecasts presented in February/March and
September. These were merely updates of the more elaborate, official forecasts. From 2013 onwards,
an official Winter forecast is presented annually.
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above the critical threshold of 3% of GDP.
Evidence that the SGP indeed induces strategic behavior by governments is
present in the work of Von Hagen and Wolff (2006) and Frankel and Schreger
(2013). Von Hagen and Wolff (2006) find that since the introduction of the SGP,
stock-flow adjustments have been used to hide budget deficits, especially when the
3% threshold is binding. Frankel and Schreger (2013) show that in euro area coun-
tries, year-ahead budget balance forecasts by national governments are overopti-
mistic when at the time of the forecast the current year budget deficit exceeds 3%
of GDP. In the interpretation of the authors, this would suggest that forecasts by
governments ‘most at risk of breaching the rules’, are the most biased.
Remarkably, however, the effect of the 3% threshold on the reliability of the
fiscal forecasts by the EC – those at the center of the SGP – has received little to no
attention. We intend to fill this gap. Given the incentives outlined above, we hypoth-
esize that whether the EC’s budget balance forecasts are biased depends on whether
or not governments expect the SGP to bind. Moreover, we expect the potential bias
to be particularly large for euro area member states. Although the SGP formally
applies to all members of the European Union (EU), only members of the euro area
face the threat of fines in case they do not comply with the rules.
We apply a novel identification strategy to determine whether a government ex-
pects its deficit to exceed the 3% threshold. This allows us to, more directly than
previous literature, causally test whether an expected violation of the 3% threshold
leads to a more optimistic forecast. We start from the idea that an optimal forecast
exists, based on all publicly and privately available information. The national gov-
ernment, having access to all relevant information, is able to construct this forecast.
Our challenge is to recover this optimal forecast. In order to do so, we purge the
realized budget balance from any unexpected economic shocks that occurred after
the original forecasting date by means of instrumental variable techniques, while
exploiting the fact that having a deficit above or below 3% of GDP is by its nature a
binary variable.
We show that, all else equal, fiscal forecasts for members of the euro area are
significantly more optimistic when the government expects the deficit to exceed 3%
of GDP. For non-euro area countries, which under the SGP do not face the risk
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of fines, such an effect cannot be established. Qualitatively, our results are robust
to various ways of controlling for crisis-induced budgetary problems and to the
exclusion of various country groups. Furthermore, we find suggestive evidence that
the size of the bias in the EC’s forecasts is smaller in those EMU countries for which
an independent fiscal council produces national macro-economic and/or budgetary
forecasts.
Our findings point to the importance of further safeguarding the independence of
the forecasts that underlie the SGP. More resources would help to reduce the EC’s
information dependence on member states. Additionally, as the EC’s Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) currently is responsible
for both the enforcement of the SGP and the preparation of the forecasts that under-
lie it, moving the forecasting team to a more technocratic unit could help to reduce
the risk of undue political influence on the forecasting process. Given that indepen-
dent fiscal forecasts at the national level appear to reduce the biases in the EC’s
forecasts, a pragmatic, ‘no-regret’ alternative to these more fundamental reforms is
to monitor and safeguard the independence of fiscal councils that have recently been
set up throughout Europe.
2.2 Related literature and hypotheses
Why would the 3% threshold enshrined in the SGP interact with the quality of fiscal
forecasts by the European Commission?
2.2.1 The SGP
The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is unique in its combina-
tion of centralized monetary policy and national fiscal policy. Already before the
introduction of the euro, the EC (1990) argued that this combination required strict
fiscal rules. “Excessive deficits” were deemed to be incompatible with EMU, as “the
policy of price stability of the EuroFed might be jeopardized if individual member
countries run up excessive public debts or deficits.”
The Treaty of Maastricht, signed in 1992, formalized the obligation of member
states to avoid “excessive” government deficits. In determining whether an exces-
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sive deficit exists, the well-known thresholds of 3% of GDP for the government
deficit and 60% of GDP for the level of government debt were given their pivotal
roles. If the planned or actual government deficit-to-GDP ratio exceeds 3%, the EC
prepares a report in which it examines, amongst others, whether the transgression
is declining and small or exceptional and temporary. If the EC considers that an
excessive deficit in a member state exists or may occur, the Commission shall ad-
dress an opinion to the Council.2 In forming its opinion, the EC takes into account
all relevant factors, including the medium-term economic and budgetary position of
the member state. On the basis of the EC’s opinion, the Economic and Financial
Affairs (Ecofin) Council eventually decides whether an excessive deficit indeed ex-
ists. Exceeding the 60% reference value for government debt-to-GDP ratio can –
unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a
satisfactory pace – set in motion the same type of procedure. However, prior to the
2011 reforms the debt criterion was not operationalized and effectively played no
role in European fiscal governance.
European fiscal rules took their concrete form with the introduction of the SGP
in 1997. The SGP explicated the corrective process for countries with excessive
deficits. This part of the Pact came to be known as the corrective arm. Countries
that are considered to have excessive deficits, are subject to the so-called Excessive
Deficit Procedure (EDP), a step-by-step procedure in which they are required to take
corrective action. In case of non-compliance, EMU member states can be required
to make a non-interest bearing deposit consisting of a fixed component of 0.2%
of GDP and a variable component equal to a tenth of the difference between the
deficit and the 3% threshold (with a combined maximum of 0.5% of GDP). The
fixed component aims at incentivizing countries to stay below the 3%-limit, while
the variable component provides an incentive to limit the size of any possible breach
of the threshold (Buti et al., 1998). In case of persistent non-compliance, the deposit
will be converted into a fine. For non-EMU member states, no forced deposits or
fines are possible. However, all EU member states (with – at the time – the exception
of the United Kingdom) potentially do face a temporary suspension in receipt of
assistance from the Cohesion Fund in case of non-compliance with the Pact. Next to
2Treaty on European, article 104c–5.
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the corrective arm, a so-called ‘preventive arm’ was introduced in the SGP to ensure
that fiscal policy is conducted in a sustainable manner over the cycle in countries
not in an EDP. Initially, no sanctions were possible under the preventive arm, with
enforcement relying on peer pressure and multilateral surveillance.
With the debt criterion not operationalized and the preventive arm turning out to
be less persuasive than expected owing to, amongst others, its reliance on peer pres-
sure (Larch et al., 2010), until 2011 the 3% threshold arguably was the most relevant
part of the SGP.3 The role of the debt criterion and the preventive arm of the SGP
changed when, in response to the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, the SGP was
amended in 2011. The so-called ‘six-pack’ (2011) operationalized the debt criterion,
so that an EDP may also be launched on the basis of a debt ratio above 60% of GDP
which does not diminish at a satisfactory pace: Countries with debts exceeding 60%
of GDP are supposed to bring down their debt by 1/20th of the excess over 60% of
GDP each year.4 Furthermore, changes were made to the preventive arm of the Pact.
A cap on the annual growth of public expenditure was introduced and “significant
deviations” from the required structural budget balance target (‘Medium Term Ob-
jectives’, MTO) or the adjustment path towards it were quantified. Moreover, mild
sanctions were introduced for countries not living up to these rules. Euro area coun-
tries now face the possibility of having to make an interest-bearing deposit of 0.2%
of GDP in case of non-compliance, with the eventual decision on sanctions taking
place on the basis of ex post data (EC, 2016; Prammer and Reiss, 2016).
The six-pack also introduced reverse qualified majority voting (RQMV) for
most decisions on sanctions within an EDP, with the aim of making the threat of
sanctions more credible. RQMV implies that a proposal or recommendation by the
Commission is considered to be adopted by the Council unless a qualified majority
of member states votes against it, thus increasing the likelihood that sanctions are
3In 2005, member state non-compliance and the perceived rigidity of the rules led to a first reform of
the SGP (Claeys et al., 2016). The adjustments aimed at enhancing the economic rationale underlying
the rules and improving their flexibility (Andrle et al., 2015) but did not fundamentally alter the
centrality of the 3% threshold.
4For member states that were subject to an EDP on 8 November 2011 a three-year transition period
applies, starting in the year following the correction of the excessive deficit, before the debt reduction
benchmark becomes relevant. This means that in our sample period, only Estonia, Finland, Luxem-
bourg and Sweden have been subject to the debt rule, and only for one year.
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imposed.
Finally, in 2013 the ‘two-pack’ and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and
Governance (TSCG, often referred to as ‘fiscal compact’, signed by 25 countries)
entered into force. Amongst others, these synchronized the budgetary timeline of
member states and called for transposing European fiscal rules in national law. Also,
the minimum requirement for the country-specific MTO was made more stringent
for countries with a debt-to-GDP ratio above 60% of GDP. Countries not at their
MTO should make sure they approach the MTO sufficiently fast, as a rule by a
minimum of 0.5% of GDP per year. Other relevant reforms include prescribing the
establishment of independent fiscal councils at the national level and the use of
macroeconomic forecasts produced or endorsed by an independent body, and ex-
pansion of the application of RQMV in the corrective arm. In practice this means
that when a euro area country breaches the deficit criterion, RQMV now applies
to all stages of the EDP – from the initial decision on whether an excessive deficit
exists, to the eventual decision on sanctions.
If working as planned, the reforms since 2011 strengthen the role of the preven-
tive arm of the SGP and increase the attention paid to debt levels. Given that our
dataset ends in 2012 (owing to the lag with which realization data become avail-
able, see section 2.3.1), the focus throughout this chapter will however be on the
3% treshold.5
2.2.2 Fiscal forecasts and the SGP
Clearly, the enforcement of European fiscal rules hinges on the quality of fiscal
forecasts, in particular on the supposedly objective benchmark provided by the EC
Spring Forecasts. After all, if the EC considers that an excessive deficit in a member
state exists or may occur, it shall address an opinion to the Council. And whether an
excess of the deficit over the 3% reference value is temporary, is explicitly decided
5Our dataset thus contains one year of data in which the reformed governance framework was appli-
cable. For most countries, this was of little relevance due to the fact that they still were in an EDP
(so that the preventive arm was not applicable) and because a transition period applied for the debt
criterion (see footnote 3). To be sure that 2012 does not unduly affect our results, we have repeated
our analysis excluding 2012. The results are similar to those reported in this chapter, and are available
upon request.
529486-L-bw-Jong-SOM
Processed on: 5-3-2019 PDF page: 30
16 Chapter 2
on the basis of budgetary forecasts provided by the EC.6 However, there are reasons
to doubt the unbiasedness of the EC’s budgetary forecasts.
First of all, countries will dislike ending up in an EDP. When in an EDP, the EC
will require a minimum amount of fiscal adjustment. This reduces the government’s
budgetary discretion. Furthermore, it brings the risk of financial sanctions if recom-
mendations are not lived up to, as described above. And finally, not following up on
recommendations when in an EDP may impose reputational costs on the incumbent
government.
Thus, countries that are not yet in an EDP but fear a breach of the deficit thresh-
old of 3% of GDP have an incentive to push forecasted deficits below the 3% thresh-
old (see also Pina and Venes, 2011). At the very least, this would result in delaying
the opening of an EDP until realization data show that the budget deficit actually
exceeded 3% of GDP. Even a delay is potentially attractive for politicians who care
about reelection and therefore have a relatively short time horizon. Successfully bi-
asing forecasts could however prevent the opening of an EDP altogether. For exam-
ple, if after the forecast cut-off date macroeconomic conditions turn out to develop
more favorable than could be foreseen, it might be the case that the realization data
never show a government budget deficit above 3% of GDP. And in case the realized
budget balance for last year does exceed 3% of GDP, forecasting a deficit below 3%
of GDP for this year might lead the EC to conclude that the excess of the deficit
above the reference value is only temporary, therefore refraining from starting an
EDP. The incentive to bias is particularly strong for EMU member states since only
they face a potential fine once they enter the EDP (and subsequently do not live up
to the ensuing recommendations).
Once countries are in an EDP, they will want to show that they are living up to
the EC’s recommendations, for otherwise the EC will require additional consolida-
tion measures. Again, this directly provides an incentive to bias forecasts so as to
suggest that the demanded fiscal effort is indeed delivered. For reasons explained
above, incentives to bias are again strongest for EMU member states. Since rec-
ommendations usually are expressed as improvements in the cyclically adjusted or
structural budget balance, variables that are estimated and non-observable by na-
6Council Regulation 1467/97 – section 2, article 2.
529486-L-bw-Jong-SOM
Processed on: 5-3-2019 PDF page: 31
Do European fiscal rules induce a bias in fiscal forecasts? 17
ture, the room for maneuver in biasing is arguably even larger for countries in an
EDP than in countries trying to avoid ending up in an EDP.
The incentives faced by national governments are likely to be reflected in the
EC’s budgetary forecasts. In practice, the EC does not have the resources to make
forecasts for each member state fully on its own and must rely in part on the informa-
tion conveyed to it by the member states (Von Hagen, 2010). This provides national
representatives with an opportunity to bias the EC’s forecasts, within certain limits,
in a favorable direction. The EC, aware of this, faces a trade-off in constructing its
forecasts. On the one hand, making use of the detailed information supplied by na-
tional agencies can improve forecast accuracy. On the other hand, this implies that
the EC will absorb more of the bias potentially present in national forecasts (see
e.g. Merola and Pérez, 2013). Since the EC is unlikely to ignore national informa-
tion sources completely, it seems likely that at least some nationally induced bias
will be present in the fiscal projections by the EC.
Until now, it was implicitly assumed that the EC’s objective is to provide neu-
tral or optimal forecasts. However, it is conceivable that the EC itself has a motive
for steering forecasts in a certain direction. For instance, overoptimistic forecasts
could be used as a means of refraining from having to start or step up an EDP pro-
cedure. Ultimately, the decision on sanctions lies with the Ecofin Council. In the
Council, member states act both as judges and defendants (Tirole, 2012). Countries
might therefore have little incentive to take an adversarial stance towards another
member state (Claeys et al., 2016). Aware of this, the EC could choose to provide
optimistic forecasts to show that the framework it oversees, is effective. In contrast,
pessimistic forecasts could prove helpful for the EC as well. Pessimistic forecasts
could help to nudge countries to take additional consolidation measures, increasing
the likelihood that (ex post) the rules are obeyed. Both strategies would have to be
balanced against the reputational loss caused by a biased forecasting record. The
EC is transparent about its forecasting record and regularly publishes evaluations of
its own forecasting performance (see e.g. Keereman, 1999; Melander et al., 2007;
Cabanillas and Terzi, 2012).
Given the incentives faced by euro area and non-euro area EU member states,
the informational dependence of the EC on those member states and, potentially, the
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EC’s private incentives, we formulate the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: EC forecasts are biased upwards when the budget deficit is expected
to exceed 3% of GDP.
Hypothesis 2: This bias is more pronounced for EMU member states than for other
EU members.
2.2.3 Related literature
The fact that governments might have an incentive to bias fiscal forecasts is well
documented. These incentives may arise from opportunistic or national motives,
such as elections, or, especially within the EU, from the institutional setting. Biases
in forecasts by national agencies have been found on many occasions (e.g. Beetsma
et al., 2009; Frankel, 2011). They have been found to be larger in countries subject
to European fiscal rules (e.g. Frankel, 2011; Pina and Venes, 2011) and to be respon-
sive to the electoral cycle (e.g. Brück and Stephán, 2006; Brogan, 2012; Merola and
Pérez, 2013). Better national fiscal institutions, in the form of stricter national fis-
cal rules (e.g. Pina and Venes, 2011; Beetsma et al., 2013; Frankel and Schreger,
2013; Debrun and Kinda, 2014; Von Hagen, 2010) or the presence of independent
fiscal councils (Debrun and Kinda, 2014) are generally associated with smaller bi-
ases. The form of fiscal governance also affects forecast errors, with forecasts by
governments operating under contracts generally being less optimistic than those of
governments operating under a delegation approach (Von Hagen, 2010), presum-
ably because this allows the finance minister to better prevent individual ministers’
tendency to overspend.
A solution to some of the issues associated with national fiscal forecasts would
be to place the forecasting responsibility at a supranational level. One would ex-
pect supranational agencies to be less sensitive to political and economic develop-
ments in individual countries when constructing their forecasts. Indeed, biases in
forecasts by supranational institutions generally are found to be smaller (Beetsma
et al., 2009). For EC forecasts, this is confirmed in the forecast evaluation by Ca-
banillas and Terzi (2012). However, in line with our earlier argument, forecasts by
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international agencies, such as the EC and OECD, turn out not to be completely im-
mune to national political-economical developments (e.g. Brück and Stephán, 2006;
Christodoulakis and Mamatzakis, 2009; Jong-A-Pin et al., 2012).
These studies do not explicitly account for the strategic effects induced by the
3% thresholds – the focus of our research. Early evidence for the strategic effects
induced by the 3% thresholds is provided by Von Hagen and Wolff (2006). These
authors scrutinize realization data, though, rather than forecast data. Following up
on theoretical work by Milesi-Ferretti (2004), they hypothesize that the SGP’s fo-
cus on the budget balance provides governments with an incentive for systematic
strategic use of stock-flow adjustments. Indeed, Von Hagen and Wolff (2006) find
that since the introduction of the SGP, recorded deficits have been lowered increas-
ingly by stock-flow adjustments. This effect is most pronounced when fiscal rules
are binding.
Frankel and Schreger (2013) pay explicit attention to the effect of the 3% thresh-
old on fiscal forecasts by national governments (specifically: excessive deficit noti-
fications). They test whether budget balance forecasts by EMU members that at the
time of the forecast had a deficit exceeding 3% of GDP are more biased than those
of countries that did not face a deficit exceeding 3% of GDP, finding an affirma-
tive answer. EMU governments facing excessive deficits thus forecast overly quick
deficit reductions. While Frankel and Schreger also hypothesize that EMU govern-
ments will be hesitant to forecast breaches of the 3% threshold, their identification
strategy offers no direct proof of this, though they do offer some other descriptive
evidence.
An alternative approach to testing the effects of European fiscal rules on fore-
casting errors is presented by Merola and Pérez (2013), though only as (minor)
digression in a broader research effort. They test whether average forecast errors are
larger for countries that have ever been under an EDP than for those that haven’t,
finding an affirmative answer. Clearly, this is quite an indirect way of identifying
the effects of European fiscal rules.7
7Merola and Pérez (2013) focus on 1999-2007. Note that for our sample period, every euro area
country except Estonia (which joined the euro area only in 2011) has been in an EDP at least once,
rendering this identification strategy infeasible.
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2.3 Data description
2.3.1 Sources and definitions
We analyze forecast errors in the EC Spring Forecasts. The literature on fiscal fore-
casts often makes the methodological distinction between fiscal targets – which as-
sume that fiscal policy measures will be taken to reach them – and fiscal forecasts,
which are of a more technical nature and actually can serve to highlight the fiscal
adjustment needed to meet the targets (e.g. Leal et al., 2008; Pina and Venes, 2011).
The EC forecasts arguably fall into the latter category, even though the forecasts
include planned policy measures that have not yet been legislated, provided they
have been specified in sufficient detail and the government is sufficiently committed
(EC, 2016). Throughout this thesis we will simply refer to the EC’s fiscal forecasts
as ‘forecasts’.
The following notation will be used throughout this chapter:
Subscript i = country
Subscript t = year to which the observation refers
Superscript t = vintage from which the observation is drawn
For forecast errors, the simple superscript t is replaced by:
Superscript t : t + x = revision between period t and period t + x
We define the forecast error as the difference between the current year forecast of a
variable and the first figure that is published in the National Accounts. This number
is published in the t + 2 Spring Forecast. For the year t budget balance (bblti,t), the
forecast error between the year t and year t + 2 forecast vintages is thus given by:
∆bblt :t+2i,t = bbl
t
i,t − bblt+2i,t (2.1)
(forecast error) = (forecast) − (realization)
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Defining the forecast error in this manner has the intuitive implication that a posi-
tive number amounts to too positive a forecast, such as an overestimate of the budget
balance or GDP growth.
Throughout this chapter, we focus on the current year forecast (t = 0 Spring
Forecast). This forecast is an important input for the proposals for the Country Spe-
cific Recommendations presented by the EC in May and potentially induces the EC
to propose the opening of an EDP, or for countries already in an EDP, abrogation
(see e.g. EC, 2014a). Therefore, the Spring Forecast has obvious relevance for na-
tional governments. Moreover, as we focus on the Spring Forecast for the running
year, the assessment of planned policy measures as well as that of the economic sit-
uation can be expected to be relatively accurate. This removes important sources of
noise compared to longer-term forecasts. As realization data, we use (in our baseline
specification) the first realization from the national accounts, which is published in
the t + 2 Spring Forecast.
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics of the main variables used in the analysis.
Short term forecast data on macro and fiscal variables, such as GDP growth, the
budget balance, the current account balance and the output gap, are taken from the
EC’s Spring Forecasts and are available in ESA95 format for the years up to 2014.8
Financial sector support data are taken from the Supplementary Tables on Financial
Sector Support, as collected by Eurostat.9 We use the composite Standard Fiscal
Rules Index, constructed by the European Commission (EC, 2014c), as a measure
of the strength of national fiscal rules. Planned elections are drawn from an updated
version of the World Bank Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001).
Data on the presence of fiscal councils is drawn from a new IMF database (Debrun
and Kinda, 2014). We have data for 2001-2014, so that, given the two-year lag
8From 2015 onwards, Spring Forecasts are in ESA2010 format. Comparing fiscal forecasts in ESA95
with realizations in ESA2010 is not informative, as this would imply assessing forecasts against
realization numbers which are not constructed in the same way. Our sample therefore ends in 2012,
for which we use the latest ESA95 realization data available (from the 2014 Spring Forecasts).
9As financial sector support data are revised over time, we match the vintages of the financial sector
support data to our realization vintages for the other variables where possible. Financial sector sup-
port data for 2012 are taken from the April 2014 vintage of the financial sector support tables, data
for 2011 from the April 2013 vintage, data for 2010 and before from the April 2012 vintage.
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we need to compute forecast errors, our sample covers 2001-2012. For the EU15
our dataset covers this entire period.10 For the ten 2004 EU-entrants, we have all
required data for the 2007-2012 period. Finally, Bulgaria and Romania are included
in the baseline from 2008 onwards.
Table 2.1. Summary statistics, EU27, 2001-2012
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Budget balance revision0:20 (%-pt) 281 0.16 2.05 -4.8 19.5
GDP growth revision0:20 (%-pt) 281 0.14 1.63 -4.5 8.4
Budget balance20 (% GDP) 281 -2.63 4.01 -31.2 6.4
Budget balance00 (% GDP) 281 -2.46 3.16 -12.0 5.3
Fiscal rules index (relative index) 281 0.55 0.99 -1.0 3.3
Planned elections (dummy var.) 281 0.17 0.37 0 1
Fiscal council (dummy var.) 281 0.24 0.43 0 1
Financial sector support (% GDP) 281 -0.15 1.26 -19.9 1.0
Output gap−10 (% pot. GDP) 259 -1.28 2.05 -11.7 3.5
Current account−10 (% GDP) 271 -1.70 6.03 -21.0 20.1
Current account01 (% GDP) 281 -1.95 6.47 -22.9 20.1
Budget balance, 4-yr average−1−1 (% GDP) 271 -1.72 3.03 -16.1 5.0
For interpretation of sub- and superscripts, see main text. As an example, current account−10 is the current year
(t = 0) level of the current account as forecasted last year (t−1). Budget balance revision0:20 is the revision to the
current year (t = 0) budget balance between the current year (t = 0) forecast and the realization number published
two years later (in the t + 2 forecast vintage). NB: The t−1 average budget balance is calculated over the period
t−4 to t−1, as reported in vintage t−1.
2.3.2 Statistical properties
We focus on the average forecast error of the budget balance – i.e., the bias. Re-
visions to well-behaved forecasts should on average be mean zero. Over the 2001-
2012 period, the average forecast error for our entire (EU) sample is 0.2% of GDP
(see table 2.1). For EMU countries, the average error is somewhat larger: 0.4% of
GDP. For non-EMU countries, the average error over the same period is –0.2% of
GDP.11
Average forecast errors, however, differ widely across countries (see figure 2.1).
Within the EMU, current year forecasts are on average notably too optimistic for
Greece, Ireland and, to a lesser extent, Cyprus, Slovakia and Spain. Forecasts were
10We have two missing observations for Luxembourg.
11Throughout the chapter, countries are assigned to either group on a year by year basis. For example,
in 2004-2007 Cyprus is part of the non-EMU sample, while from 2008 onwards it is counted as a
euro area member state.
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on average most cautious in Luxembourg and Estonia. Outside the EMU, forecasts
for Bulgaria and Romania were especially overoptimistic, while Cyprus stands out
as being too pessimistic in its pre-euro years.
Figure 2.1. Average forecast errors, 2001-2012
(a) EMU member states (b) Non-EMU member states
Forecast errors are skewed to the right, i.e., highly overoptimistic forecasts are
overrepresented (figure 2.2, left-hand side). This is at least to some extent because
our sample includes the financial crisis. In that period, budget deficits in a number
of countries were affected heavily by measures taken to support the financial sector.
As rescue operations and support packages for banks generally were announced at
the last minute, and the Spring Forecasts are published early in the year, most of
the financial sector support measures will not have been included in the forecasts,
in some cases leading to a severe underestimation of the budget deficit.12 Clearly,
when assessing forecast accuracy it is important to correct for this.
Based on Eurostat data (see section 2.3.1), we construct a variable measuring
the effect of support for the financial sector on the budget balance as a percentage
of GDP. If financial sector support measures were indeed unanticipated, a regres-
sion of the forecast error on the financial sector support variable should return a
coefficient of minus one. We indeed find an estimate close to minus one, suggesting
that by and large financial sector support measures were not included in the forecast
(table 2.2, column 1). We will therefore control for financial sector support in our
12Financial sector support has a direct effect on government gross debt, but only affects the budget
balance in case of capital transfers.
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Figure 2.2. Distribution of forecast errors, 2001-2012
(a) Full sample (b) Corrected for fin. sector support
The right-hand side figure shows budget balances after subtraction of financial sector support. This simple approach
is warranted as the regression coefficient on financial sector support ≈ 1 in table 2.2.
regressions.13 Controlling for financial sector support also takes care of most ex-
treme observations, alleviating the need to manually exclude crisis-driven outliers.
To make sure that some of the remaining extreme deficits do not drive our results
unduly, in our robustness checks we take the more rigorous approach of dropping
the observations with the 1% or 5% most extreme forecast errors on one or both
tails.
If forecasts make full and efficient use of all available information, data revi-
sions should be unpredictable given the information set available at the time of the
forecast (Nordhaus, 1987; Gentry, 1989). We follow De Castro et al. (2013) by run-
ning a basic regression of the average forecast error on the level of the forecast. To
avoid our results being distorted by financial sector support, we include the financial
sector measure introduced above in the regression. We find a statistically significant
positive relation between the level of the forecasted budget balance and the fore-
cast error (table 2.2, column 2). As such, the direction of the error can be predicted
based on the level of the forecasted budget balance, suggesting that the information
set available at the time of the forecast has not been put to full, efficient use.
13As pointed out by Gandrud and Hallerberg (2014), the timing of financial sector support could
be driven by political considerations, e.g. related to elections. However, this is not likely to affect
our analysis since financial sector support was generally not anticipated at the time of the Spring
Forecast and, moreover, we control for the effect of financial sector support on the forecast error.
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Table 2.2. Forecast properties
Dependent variable: ∆bblt :t+2i,t
(1) (2)








Regressions include country fixed effects. Clustered robust standard er-




By hypothesis 1, we expect that the prevalence of a bias in the EC’s forecast de-
pends on whether the SGP is expected to be binding. This requires us to separate
the countries that expect to be in violation of the 3% ceiling from those deeming
themselves safe. We cannot do this on the basis of the EC’s official forecasts, as
under our hypothesis these will be biased in case the 3% threshold is expected to be
binding.
To identify countries with an expected deficit larger than 3% of GDP, we there-
fore resort to realization data. We start from the idea that an optimal forecast exi-
sist that incorporates all publicly and privately available information. We dub this
the clean forecast. Only the national government or representative has access to all
relevant information and is therefore able to construct this forecast. Let us denote
the government’s clean budget balance forecast by bblexpi,t . With sgp
exp
i,t indicating





0 if bblexpi,t >−3
(2.2)
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Since bblexpi,t is unobserved, so is sgp
exp
i,t . We do however observe the realized budget
balance. By definition, this is equal to the clean forecast plus or minus any unex-
pected shocks occurring in the course of the year. As these shocks take place after
the period t forecast has been made, but before the t = 2 realization is published,
we label them εi,t+1:
bblt+2i,t ≡ bblexpi,t + εi,t+1 (2.3)
Based on the realized budget balance, we construct a dummy variable indicating
whether a country’s realized budget deficit violates the 3% ceiling – an imperfect





0 if bblt+2i,t >−3
(2.4)
Equivalently, combining equations (2.2) and (2.3):
sgpt+2i,t = sgp
exp
i,t + f (εi,t+1) (2.5)
As we expect that the presence of a bias in the EC’s forecast depends on whether or
not governments expect the 3% threshold to bind14, we have that:
∆bblt :t+2i,t = α ∗ sgpexpi,t + εi,t+1 (2.6)
Substituting in sgpt+2i,t as our proxy for the unobservable sgp
exp
i,t and using equation
(2.5):
∆bblt :t+2i,t = α ∗ (sgpexpi,t + f (εi,t+1))+ εi,t+1 (2.7)
We thus end up with a classic endogeneity problem, as third factors captured by
εi,t+1 may be driving both the realized budget balance and our proxy for sgpexpi,t . To
14Effectively, we test if forecasts are on average more optimistic in case the rules of the SGP bind.
This is the most general way to test for an SGP-induced bias, as it does not require us to specify an
exact functional form for the expected bias. Averages can, however, be disproportionally affected
by extreme values. We show in section 2.5 that, qualitatively, this does not drive our results.
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identify the effect of sgpexpi,t on ∆bbl
t :t+2
i,t we will therefore make use of instrumental
variable techniques. We instrument sgpt+2i,t using information available at time t, that
is, information that should in principle be uncorrelated with the unexpected shock
εi,t+1. Since under the SGP only EMU members face the possibility of sanctions, we
allow the effect of an expected violation of the 3% ceiling to differ between EMU
and non-EMU member states within the EU.
2.4.2 Estimation procedure
We estimate the following equation:




i,t ∗EMUi,t)+β3EMUi,t +µC i,t +ρi + γt (2.8)
Here, sgpt+2i,t is a dummy equal to one if the realized budget deficit of country i at
time t exceeds 3% of GDP and EMUi,t a dummy equal to one if country i is at time
t a member of the euro area. C i,t denotes a vector of control variables containing the
controls from our efficiency test, namely the year t forecast for the country i, year t
level of the budget balance and the measure for financial sector support measures.
The vector furthermore always includes the revision to GDP, to control for the effect
of unexpected shocks to GDP growth on the budget balance forecast error;15 ρi is a
country i fixed effect and γt a year t time dummy.
Depending on the specification, a dummy for planned elections16, the fiscal rule
index and a dummy for the presence of a fiscal council providing independent macro
15Growth surprises are potentially endogenous to the extent that unforeseen changes in the fiscal
stance lead to a budget balance forecast error while simultaneously affecting GDP growth. This
effect is likely to be small, as we focus on current year forecasts published in spring. By then,
most policy measures will be known. Nevertheless, caution is required in interpreting the effect of
the GDP forecast error on the budget balance forecast error as causal. Under the assumption of
conditional mean independence, potential endogeneity of GDP growth does not prevent a causal
interpretation of other coefficients.
16Throughout our analysis, we focus on planned elections (elections following the end of the gov-
ernment’s term in office), as truly unplanned elections will not induce strategic behavior. However,
as noted by one of the referees, “unplanned” (snap) elections are in fact not always completely
unplanned. We have repeated our analysis controlling for all elections. Our main results are unaf-
fected, with the coefficient on elections falling somewhat in size compared to when we only include
unplanned elections – suggesting that, on average, planned elections induce more of a bias than
unplanned ones. Results are available upon request.
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and/or budgetary forecasts are included as well.17 The electoral cycle has often been
shown to impact the quality of fiscal forecasts (see e.g. Brück and Stephán, 2006;
Brogan, 2012; Merola and Pérez, 2013). However, we do not have clear expecta-
tions on the sign of the effect on theoretical grounds. On the one hand, a govern-
ment could have an incentive to be overoptimistic, so as to create fiscal room for
maneuver prior to Election Day. On the other hand, the government may prefer to
be pessimistic in order to show its competence by being able to pursue unexpected
expansionary fiscal policies (Bohn, 2014). A stricter national institutional setting,
as measured by the fiscal rule index, is generally found to be associated with more
prudent forecasts (e.g. Frankel and Schreger, 2013; Pina and Venes, 2011; Debrun
and Kinda, 2014). Likewise, we would expect the presence of an independent fiscal
council to coincide with a smaller upward bias in fiscal forecasts. Indeed, Debrun
and Kinda (2014) show that countries with independent fiscal councils producing
macroeconomic and/or budgetary forecasts, official forecasts of the budget balance
are less biased and more accurate, while also confirming the finding by Jonung and
Larch (2006) that independent fiscal councils produce less biased GDP forecasts.
Frankel and Schreger (2013) do not find a bias reducing effect of fiscal councils
in general. Interestingly, however, for EMU member states with large deficits fiscal
councils are found to reduce the forecast bias.
As outlined above, the major challenge lies in reliably estimating the coefficients
on sgpt+2i,t and sgp
t+2
i,t ∗EMUi,t . We will instrument these variables to circumvent
the endogeneity problem that results from the correlation between sgpt+2i,t and the
error term. Owing to the binary nature of the instrumented variable we resort to
probit-2SLS (cf. Wooldridge (2002), procedure 18.1) as applied using panel data by,
amongst others, Adams et al. (2009). Even though the consistency of 2SLS does not
hinge on choosing the right functional form in the first stage, 2SLS is known to be
biased in small samples. Weak instruments amplify this bias. Exploiting the binary
nature of our endogenous variable increases the power of our instruments, giving
us better small sample properties. Compared to other ways of taking the binary
nature of our endogeneous variable into account,18 probit-2SLS has the advantage
17Our data do not allow us to distinguish between fiscal councils in charge of macro-economic and/or
budgetary forecasts.
18Such as directly plugging in fitted values from a probit model into the main regression, which is
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that it does not require the binary response model to be correctly specified and that
it preserves the (asymptotic) validity of the standard IV standard errors.
Probit-2SLS is a three-stage procedure. Before applying the 2SLS-procedure,
we estimate a probit model in which our endogeneous variable is regressed on our
exogenous instruments and control variables from the second stage regression:
sgpt+2i,t = α+θZ i,t + δ1EMUi,t + ξC i,t (2.9)
where Z i,t is a vector of instruments.
Equation (2.9) is used to predict fitted values for sgpt+2i,t . Then, the fitted values,
˜sgpt+2i,t , and their interaction with the EMU dummy, ˜sgp
t+2
i,t ∗EMUi,t , are used as
instruments for sgpt+2i,t and sgp
t+2
i,t ∗EMUi,t in our main (2SLS) regression. In all
stages of the analysis we use standard errors clustered by country, which are robust
to both heteroscedasticity and arbitrary intra-country autocorrelation.
2.4.3 Instrument selection
Instruments should be relevant and exogenous, that is, predictive of whether or not
a deficit exceeds the 3% threshold and uncorrelated with unexpected shocks to the
budget balance.
Evidently exogenous macroeconomic instruments are notoriously hard to find.
We therefore proceed as follows. First, we select a number of variables that – while
potentially predictive of large deficits – in our setting have no obvious relationship
with the average revision to the budget balance. Those variables include a country’s
current account balance (as indicator of macroeconomic imbalances), its debt level,
the size of the output gap (indicator of the stance of the business cycle) and the
country’s budgetary track record (defined as its average budget balance over the
past four years), as well as lags, squares and cubes of those variables.19
To guarantee exogeneity to the largest possible extent, we then employ three ad-
only consistent if the probit model is correctly specified.
19The output gap has in fact been used as an explanatory variable for budget balance forecast errors
in, for example, Frankel and Schreger (2013). They show the level of the output gap to be predictive
of the GDP forecast error, and thereby of the budget balance forecast error. We control for the GDP
forecast error directly, however, so as to close off this channel.
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ditional safeguards. First, we include as instruments only variables that are available
at the time of forecast t. In the absence of autocorrelation, they should therefore be
uncorrelated with unexpected shock εi,t+1. Second, we refrain from using variables
from the current vintage of the forecast. After all, if a country seeks to bias its fore-
cast for year t’s budget deficit, it might also do this by distorting other components
of the forecast. Third, we include the current year forecast for the level of the bud-
get balance (explicitly controlling for the information set available at the time of the
forecast) and the revision of GDP growth in every specification of the second stage
regression (to already filter out some events that we know should have affected the
budget balance forecast error). This implies that for instruments to be invalidated,
they should influence the average fiscal forecast error through channels other than
either the GDP forecast error or the level of the forecasted budget balance.
As a robustness check, we will also report results where one further lag of all
instruments is used. Those instruments are derived from the t−2 or earlier vintage
of the forecasts and are valid even in the presence of AR(1) forecast errors.
Instrument selection is then done through an a-theoretic general-to-specific ap-
proach. Our final instrument set contains variants of the current account balance,
the level of the output gap and the budgetary track record (all derived from the t−1
forecast vintage). The F-test shows that, in a probit setting, this is quite a powerful
set of instruments (see table 2.4 in the appendix).
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Main results
Table 2.3 presents the main results of this chapter. The dependent variable in all
columns is the forecast error of the budget balance in the current year, with a positive
number pointing at a too favorable forecast.
As shown in column 1, the expectation of exceeding the 3% threshold – as iden-
tified by our instrumented sgp-dummy – induces a positive bias in budget balance
forecasts for EMU member states. This effect is economically large and signifi-
cant: all else equal, fiscal forecasts for EMU member states with a ‘truly expected
deficit’ above 3% of GDP are on average 1.3 percentage points too optimistic. For
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non-EMU countries, a positive bias cannot be established. The coefficient on the
interaction term sgp ∗EMU , which estimates the extent to which the effect of sgp
on the forecast errors is stronger for EMU than non-EMU countries, is large and
statistically significant at the 10% level.
The signs on the control variables are as expected. The effects of the level of the
current year budget balance forecast and the measure for financial sector support
are broadly similar to those in the efficiency tests presented earlier. Shocks to GDP
growth are positively correlated with the fiscal forecast error.
Next, we successively add our political economy and institutional controls to
the model. In a year with planned elections, budget forecasts tend to be overopti-
mistic. This provides evidence in support of the ‘room for maneuver’ hypothesis,
in line with the results of Boylan (2008), Heinemann (2006) and Jong-A-Pin et al.
(2012), amongst others. Stronger national fiscal rules are associated with less opti-
mistic forecasts, confirming findings by Frankel and Schreger (2013). In contrast,
independent fiscal councils do not have a statistically significant effect on the av-
erage forecast error. This is somewhat surprising given the findings by, amongst
others, Debrun et al. (2013), but is likely related to the fact that in our sample the
presence of fiscal council varies little over time, which in a fixed effects setting al-
most by definition makes it difficult to identify any effect. We revisit the role of
fiscal councils in section 2.5.2.
In columns 5-8 we proceed using lagged instruments so as to further safeguard
their exogeneity.20 The results closely resemble those in columns 1-4. For EMU
member states the threat of exceeding the 3% threshold still induces a sizeable posi-
tive bias in budget balance forecasts. Point estimates are even somewhat larger now,
though the same holds true for the standard errors. For non-EMU member states an
SGP-induced bias still can not be established.
2.5.2 The role of fiscal councils
In response to the crisis, European policy makers implemented measures to improve
fiscal governance in the EU. The TSCG and two-pack paved the way for an explicit
20In columns 1-4 all instruments are already lagged once; in columns 5-8 they are lagged twice so as
to make them exogenous even in case of autocorrelated forecasting errors.
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Table 2.3. Main results
∆bblt :t+2i,t Probit-2SLS Probit-2SLS, lagged instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
sgpt+2i,t 0.33 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 0.66 0.24 0.39 0.48
(0.63) (0.64) (0.61) (0.60) (0.74) (0.80) (0.75) (0.78)
sgpt+2i,t ∗EMUi,t 0.99* 1.34** 1.45** 1.46** 1.02 1.33* 1.35* 1.27
(0.58) (0.61) (0.61) (0.60) (0.70) (0.76) (0.77) (0.78)
EMUi,t 0.17 -0.03 -0.10 -0.15 0.62 0.41 0.36 0.39
(0.67) (0.68) (0.68) (0.66) (0.87) (0.90) (0.91) (0.91)
bblti,t 0.18** 0.17** 0.18** 0.19** 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.24***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Fin. sector supporti,t -0.99*** -0.99*** -1.01*** -1.01*** -1.00*** -1.01*** -1.02*** -1.02***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
∆GDP growtht :t+2i,t 0.23*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.24*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Planned electionsi,t 0.77*** 0.78*** 0.76*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.66***
(0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19)
Fiscal rule indexi,t -0.45* -0.45* -0.42 -0.40
(0.27) (0.27) (0.29) (0.29)
Fiscal councili,t -0.35 0.30
(0.46) (0.37)
sgpt+2i,t | EMUi,t = 1 1.32** 1.27** 1.38** 1.43** 1.68** 1.58** 1.74*** 1.75***
(0.62) (0.61) (0.60) (0.58) (0.68) (0.65) (0.64) (0.65)
Observations 258 258 258 258 231 231 231 231
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Period 2001-12 2001-12 2001-12 2001-12 2002-12 2002-12 2002-12 2002-12
R2 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.71
F-test excl. instruments 24.60 21.93 21.53 21.68 14.19 12.98 12.26 11.99
All regressions include country FE and year dummies; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. sgpt+2i,t and
sgpt+2i,t ∗EMUi,t are instrumented using the predicted values from a probit regression, see section 4. In columns 1-4,




i,t , and squares and cubes of the lagged 4-year average of the
budget balance serve as exogenous instruments. See table 2.4. In columns 5-8, instruments are the same, but lagged one
additional period. See table 2.5. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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role for independent fiscal councils. Those in many countries newly installed inde-
pendent bodies should provide public assessments over whether budgetary plans are
in line with national and European fiscal rules. Independence would be guaranteed
by i) a statutory regime grounded in law; ii) freedom from interference, and having
the ability to communicate publicly in a timely manner; iii) nomination procedures
based on experience and competence and iv) adequacy of resources and appropri-
ate access to information to carry out the given mandate (EC, 2012). Moreover, the
macroeconomic forecasts used in the budgeting process should now be prepared
or endorsed by an independent institution, though not necessarily the fiscal council
itself.
Frankel and Schreger (2013) find that for EMU members with large deficits, fis-
cal councils reduce the bias in national forecasts. In constructing its forecasts, the
EC depends to a large extent on information obtained from national governments
(Von Hagen, 2010). This issue becomes particularly pressing when countries face
binding fiscal rules. Therefore, we test whether in countries with an independent
fiscal council in charge of making macroeconomic and/or budgetary forecasts, the
bias associated with the 3% threshold is smaller. We augment our baseline model
by allowing the coefficients on sgp and sgp∗EMU to vary between countries (and
years) where national macro and/or budgetary forecasts are prepared by an indepen-
dent agency and countries (and years) where this is not the case. Now we find that
– for EMU members – having an independent fiscal council mitigates the overop-
timism present in forecasts when the 3% threshold is expected to be exceeded (see
table 2.6), although the difference is significant only at the 10% level.
Moreover, some caution is warranted in interpreting this result causally. The
existence of a fiscal council is probably not fully exogenous: countries with a pref-
erence for fiscal discipline might be more likely to install a fiscal council in the
first place. In that case, the general preference for fiscal discipline explains both
the existence of a fiscal council and the smaller bias in fiscal forecasts in general.
This would imply that the establishment of fiscal councils throughout Europe cannot
automatically be expected to reduce fiscal forecast biases.
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2.5.3 Robustness
Since the eruption of the financial crisis, budget deficits exceeding 3% of GDP are
more prevalent than before. During the years 2001-2007, 43% of EU budget bal-
ances exceeded the 3% threshold, while for the years 2008-2012 the equivalent
number is 65%. Moreover, during 2008-2012 budget balances often surprised on
the downside: the average budget balance forecast in the EU was 0.5 percentage
point too optimistic, compared to an average forecast error of close to zero during
2001-2007.
In order to test whether the crisis period therefore drives our results, we allow
the coefficients on sgp and sgp∗EMU to differ pre- and post financial crisis. Both
before and after 2008, forecasts are biased upwards for EMU countries expecting
to be in violation of the 3% threshold, though prior to 2008 the bias is significant
only at the 10% level. We find no evidence of a structural break: even though the
point estimate of the bias is larger post-2008, the difference with respect to the pre-
crisis period is not statistically significant. For non-EMU countries, no significant
bias can be found in either period, although the point estimate in pre-crisis years
becomes similar in magnitude to the one found for EMU-members (table 2.7).
Next, we want to make sure that our results are not driven by extreme obser-
vations. As figure 2.2 made clear, if anything, extreme forecast errors are skewed
to the right, i.e., much worse than expected budget balances occur more often than
large favorable surprises. Therefore, we alternately drop 1% and 5% of the observa-
tions with the largest positive forecast errors, and 1% and 5% of the most extreme
observations on both tails (so in the latter case, 10% of the total observations is
dropped).
We qualitatively obtain the same results as before (see table 2.8). For EMU
member states, expecting a large deficit is found to cause an upward bias in budget
balance forecasts by the EC. The point estimate of the effect declines somewhat if
more observations are dropped, but remains significant. For non-EMU members, we
generally find no evidence of a significant bias related to the 3% threshold, except
in the case where 5% of the observations on both tails is dropped. Remarkably, the
coefficient on sgp then becomes significantly negative. This could imply that non-
EMU countries at risk of large deficits, take consolidation measures not included in
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the forecast. However, this result is not robust to using twice lagged instruments.
In table 2.9 we explore the dependence of our results on the inclusion of spe-
cific countries or country groups. As a first test, we drop Greece from the sample,
which is known to have been misreporting data on several occasions (EC, 2010).21
This leaves results by and large unchanged. Secondly, we drop observations for
countries in the years in which they received support from the European Financial
Stability Facility (EFSF) or the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Most coun-
tries in EFSF/ESM programs repeatedly missed their fiscal targets: for countries in
an EFSF/ESM program, fiscal forecasts in our sample are on average 1.3 percentage
points too optimistic. This does, however, not drive our results, as column 2 shows
that their exclusion again leaves our results virtually unchanged. Next, we exclude
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (the ‘GIIPS’ countries) from the sample
altogether. This imposes a rather strong test on our results, since not only does it
cost us many observations, these observations also contain a relatively large share
of positive forecast errors. Nevertheless, our earlier findings are confirmed quali-
tatively. The point estimate of the bias for EMU member states drops to 0.7, but
it remains significant at the 10% level. The declining coefficient indicates that on
average the forecasts for the GIIPS have been among the more overoptimistic. For
non-EMU member states, still no bias can be established. The difference between
the effect of the SGP on EMU and non-EMU countries is smaller than before and is
no longer statistically significant.
In columns 4-6 we check the sensitivity of our results to, respectively, the in-
clusion of small countries, large countries and ‘late entrants’ into our panel (mostly
Eastern European countries, for which we have data only starting in 2006). The
empirical results resemble the baseline findings to a large extent, although the bias
found for EMU members seems to increase when we leave out the four largest coun-
tries (Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom), suggesting that in forecasts
for larger countries, biases tend to be smaller. This could be the result of a smaller
information asymmetry between those governments and the EC. An alternative ex-
planation is that larger countries have a lesser need of bias, as they have more lever-
21Greece is the individual country with the largest effect on estimation results.
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age over the EC and are therefore better able to ‘bend the rules’.22
Finally, the results are not sensitive to the ‘realization’ data vintage. Using the
most recent historical realization data for the whole period, rather than the first
national account vintage as available in real time, our earlier results are confirmed
(table 2.10).
2.6 Concluding remarks
With numerical rules at the heart of European fiscal surveillance, it is of the utmost
importance that the data on which surveillance is based are accurate and unbiased.
Our results show that, all else equal, for members of the EMU the EC’s fiscal fore-
casts are more optimistic when the 3% threshold is expected to bind. For member
states of the European Union that are not part of the EMU, such an effect cannot be
established. Qualitatively, this result does not seem driven by crisis countries, finan-
cial sector support, small or large countries or extreme forecast errors. Independent
fiscal councils at the national level producing macro-economic and/or budgetary
forecasts appear to mitigate the bias, although the presence of fiscal councils is po-
tentially endogenous, as countries with a preference for fiscal discipline might be
more likely to install a fiscal council in the first place.
Our findings point to the need of further safeguarding the quality of forecasts
underlying the SGP. The recent reforms of the European fiscal governance frame-
work likely go some way in that direction. Independent fiscal councils have been
established in multiple member states and macroeconomic projections should now
be prepared or endorsed by an independent institution. Our results suggest that this
will also benefit the EC’s forecasts. Furthermore, incentives for biasing forecasts
could have declined to the extent that financial sanctions based on excessive real-
ized budget deficits have become more likely for euro area member states by the
introduction of reverse qualified majority voting in the voting-procedure on sanc-
tions. However, overoptimistic forecasts still offer a way to prevent or delay the
opening of an Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) or to suggest that effective action
22Chang (2006) argues that under the SGP large countries have had an easier time than small ones,
with the most obvious beneficiaries of ‘favoritism’ being France and Germany.
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is delivered in response to Council recommendations. As the stakes remain high,
incentives to bias will likely continue to exist, too.
Further improvements thus remain welcome. Some options can be identified.
Additional human resources could help to reduce the EC’s informational depen-
dence on member states, although the EC will always have an informational disad-
vantage compared to national representatives. Additionally, as the EC’s Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Affairs currently is responsible for both the
enforcement of the SGP and the preparation of the forecasts that underlie it, moving
the forecasting team to a more technocratic unit could help to reduce any undue
political influence on the forecasting process. Our results suggest this will also help
improve EC forecast quality. Additionally, newly established fiscal councils need
time to develop the competent and impartial reputation necessary to guarantee their
independence (Calmfors and Wren-Lewis, 2011). In the meantime, monitoring and
supporting their independence is essential.
Identification of more targeted improvements would be facilitated by knowing
what drives our findings. Is it the informational dependence of the EC on national
governments, which are trying to bias forecasts in a favorable direction? Or does
the EC itself have some sort of incentive to present too optimistic forecasts in case
of binding fiscal rules? Our results suggest that the first channel is at least to some
extent relevant, as the bias in EC forecasts turns out to be responsive to national
factors, such as elections or the presence of a fiscal council. However, on the basis of
our findings we cannot exclude that also the EC itself is a source of overoptimism. A
direct comparison between forecasts constructed by national member states in their
EDP notifications and the EC’s forecasts could shed light on the relative importance
of both channels. This is work for future research.
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Appendix
Table 2.4. Predicting excessive deficits - probit
Dependent variable: sgpt+2t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Current accountt−1i,t -0.61*** -0.61*** -0.61*** -0.64***
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21)
Current accountt−1i,t−1 0.51*** 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.52***
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
Output gapt−1i,t 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.22***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
bbl mean, squarei,t−1 -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.12***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
bbl mean, cubei,t−1 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EMUi,t 0.52 0.52 0.57 0.58
(0.33) (0.35) (0.45) (0.45)
bblti,t -1.01*** -1.01*** -1.02*** -1.01***
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Fin. sector supporti,t -0.64 -0.66 -0.65 -0.69
(0.53) (0.52) (0.51) (0.52)
∆GDP growtht :t+2i,t 0.38*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.36***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Planned electionsi,t 0.41 0.41 0.38
(0.40) (0.40) (0.40)




Observations 258 258 258 258
Countries 27 27 27 27
Period 2001-12 2001-12 2001-12 2001-12
Pseudo R2 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.66
F-test excl. instruments 24.60 21.93 21.53 21.68
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Probit-regressions are used to construct
the instruments used in the 2SLS regressions in table 2.3, columns 1-4. Exogenous re-
gressors as well as control variables from the second stage of the 2SLS-procedure are
included in the probit-regression. Therefore, interpretation of coefficients of exoge-
nous regressors in the probit-regression is conditional on second stage endogenous
regressors (most notably, the forecasted level of the budget balance). *** significant
at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table 2.5. Predicting excessive deficits - probit, lagged instruments
Dependent variable: sgpt+2t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Current accountt−2t−1 -0.40* -0.36* -0.35* -0.36*
(0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Current accountt−2t−2 0.34* 0.31* 0.31* 0.31*
(0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
Output gapt−2i,t−1 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
bbl mean, squarei,t−2 -0.12*** -0.12** -0.12*** -0.12***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
bbl mean, cubei,t−2 -0.02*** -0.02** -0.02** -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EMUi,t 0.30 0.24 0.01 0.01
(0.35) (0.35) (0.37) (0.38)
bblti,t -0.86*** -0.88*** -0.88*** -0.87***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
Fin. sector supporti,t -0.69 -0.69 -0.67 -0.68
(0.57) (0.57) (0.55) (0.55)
∆GDP growtht :t+2i,t 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Planned electionsi,t 0.52* 0.57* 0.54*
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31)




Observations 231 231 231 231
Countries 27 27 27 27
Period 2002-12 2002-12 2002-12 2002-12
Pseudo R2 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.64
F-test excl. instruments 14.19 12.98 12.26 11.99
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Probit-regressions are used to construct
the instruments used in the 2SLS regressions in table 2.3, columns 5-8. Exogenous re-
gressors as well as control variables from the second stage of the 2SLS-procedure are
included in the probit-regression. Therefore, interpretation of coefficients of exoge-
nous regressors in the probit-regression is conditional on second stage endogenous
regressors (most notably, the forecasted level of the budget balance). *** significant
at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table 2.6. Role of independent fiscal councils
Dependent variable: ∆bblt :t+2i,t
Effect sgpt+2i,t | EMUi,t = 0






Effect sgpt+2i,t | EMUi,t = 1










Fin. sector supporti,t -1.00***
(0.03)














F-test excluded instruments 20.69
Estimated by probit-2SLS. Regression includes country FE and year dummies;
cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. sgpt+2i,t and sgp
t+2
i,t ∗EMUi,t are instru-
mented using the predicted values from a probit regression, see section 2.4. Current




i,t , and second and third powers of the
lagged 4-year average of the budget balance serve as exogenous instruments. ***
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table 2.7. Pre- vs. post-crisis effects SGP
Dependent variable: ∆bblt :t+2i,t


















Fin. sector supporti,t -1.01***
(0.03)
















F-test excluded instruments 31.46
Estimated by probit-2SLS. Regression includes country FE and year dummies;
cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. sgpt+2i,t and sgp
t+2
i,t ∗EMUi,t are instru-
mented using the predicted values from a probit regression, see section 2.4. Current




i,t , and second and third powers of the
lagged 4-year average of the budget balance serve as exogenous instruments. ***
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table 2.8. Main results, sensitivity to outliers
∆bblt :t+2i,t Probit-2SLS Probit-2SLS, lagged instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
p0-p99 p0-p95 p1-p99 p5-p95 p0-p99 p0-p95 p1-p99 p5-p95
sgpt+2i,t -0.07 -0.63 -0.18 -1.14** 0.38 -1.11 0.37 -0.12
(0.60) (0.64) (0.61) (0.57) (0.76) (0.69) (0.72) (0.83)
sgpt+2i,t ∗EMUi,t 1.41** 1.59*** 1.51** 1.94*** 1.22 2.06*** 1.20 1.32*
(0.62) (0.60) (0.60) (0.51) (0.79) (0.64) (0.74) (0.78)
EMUi,t -0.07 -0.02 -0.55 -0.52 0.45 -0.37 -0.39 0.56
(0.65) (0.58) (0.41) (0.34) (0.91) (0.64) (0.54) (0.86)
bbltt 0.15** 0.09 0.13** 0.10* 0.20*** 0.13** 0.18*** 0.13**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Fin. sector supporti,t -0.79*** -0.74*** -0.78*** -0.73*** -0.80*** -0.72*** -0.78*** -0.74***
(0.12) (0.17) (0.12) (0.17) (0.13) (0.17) (0.13) (0.18)
∆GDP growtht :t+2i,t 0.26*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.26*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.24***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Planned electionsi,t 0.80*** 0.57*** 0.79*** 0.55*** 0.71*** 0.48*** 0.70*** 0.46**
(0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.21)
Fiscal rule indexi,t -0.36 -0.41* -0.34 -0.42* -0.30 -0.33 -0.26 -0.32
(0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.25) (0.25) (0.21) (0.24) (0.24)
Fiscal councili,t -0.26 -0.15 -0.24 0.00 0.40 0.99*** 0.44 0.87***
(0.46) (0.50) (0.44) (0.49) (0.40) (0.26) (0.40) (0.27)
sgpt+2i,t | EMUi,t = 1 1.34** 0.95** 1.33** 0.80* 1.59*** 0.95** 1.58*** 1.20**
(0.53) (0.44) (0.53) (0.41) (0.57) (0.41) (0.54) (0.47)
Observations 256 245 254 234 229 207 227 218
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Period 2001-12 2001-12 2001-12 2001-12 2002-12 2002-12 2002-12 2002-12
R2 0.53 0.42 0.53 0.38 0.57 0.43 0.57 0.48
F-test excluded instr. 21.68 18.20 25.64 17.45 11.98 10.52 11.09 11.07
Regressions include country FE and year dummies; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. sgp and sgp∗EMU are
instrumented using the predicted values from a probit regression, see section 2.4. In columns 1-3, Current accountt−1i,t ,
Current accountt−1i,t−1, Output gap
t−1
i,t and squares and cubes of the lagged 4-year average of the budget balance serve as
exogenous instruments. In columns 5-8, instruments are the same, but lagged one additional period. *** significant at 1%,
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table 2.9. Geographical sensitivity
∆bblt :t+2i,t Probit-2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Excl. Excl. EFSF/ Excl. Excl. four Excl. four EU15
Greece ESM prog. GIIPS smallest largest only
sgpt+2i,t -0.42 -0.52 0.34 0.08 0.54 -0.64
(0.65) (0.62) (0.64) (0.56) (0.65) (0.97)
sgpt+2i,t ∗EMUi,t 1.52** 1.72*** 0.32 1.38** 1.49** 1.83**
(0.65) (0.66) (0.43) (0.57) (0.74) (0.74)
EMUi,t -0.01 -0.29 0.42 -0.47 -0.47
(0.66) (0.68) (0.59) (0.53) (0.69)
bbltt 0.13** 0.17** 0.26*** 0.20** 0.22*** 0.18
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12)
Fin. sector supporti,t -1.01*** -0.60** -0.40** -1.01*** -1.01*** -1.01***
(0.02) (0.25) (0.16) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
∆GDP growtht :t+2i,t 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.31***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11)
Planned electionsi,t 0.82*** 0.79*** 0.51*** 0.80*** 0.84*** 0.56**
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.23)
Fiscal rule indexi,t -0.30 -0.33 -0.46** -0.38 -0.72** -0.36
(0.22) (0.22) (0.19) (0.28) (0.34) (0.37)
Fiscal councili,t -0.44 -1.52*** -1.77*** -0.28 -0.33 0.59
(0.43) (0.38) (0.44) (0.48) (0.38) (0.56)
sgpt+2i,t | EMUi,t = 1 1.11** 1.20** 0.67* 1.46** 2.03*** 1.19**
(0.53) (0.50) (0.39) (0.60) (0.76) (0.55)
Observations 246 249 198 227 210 178
Countries 26 27 22 23 23 15
Period 2001-12 2001-12 2001-12 2001-12 2001-12 2001-12
R2 0.71 0.50 0.56 0.69 0.71 0.72
F-test excluded instr. 18.35 21.80 22.31 18.04 18.68 14.80
Regressions include country FE and year dummies; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. sgp and sgp∗EMU
are instrumented using the predicted values from a probit regression, see section 2.4. Current accountt−1i,t , Current
accountt−1i,t−1, Output gap
t−1
i,t and squares and cubes of the lagged 4-year average of the budget balance serve as
exogenous instruments. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
529486-L-bw-Jong-SOM
Processed on: 5-3-2019 PDF page: 58
44 Chapter 2
Table 2.10. Final realizations
∆bblt : f inali,t Probit-2SLS Probit-2SLS, lagged instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
sgp f inali,t 0.81 0.52 0.43 0.48 1.03 0.77 0.79 0.83
(0.67) (0.69) (0.66) (0.66) (0.92) (0.97) (0.98) (1.00)
sgp f inali,t ∗EMUi,t 0.93 1.21* 1.37* 1.35* 0.78 0.93 1.07 1.00
(0.68) (0.72) (0.75) (0.77) (0.90) (0.97) (1.04) (1.05)
EMUi,t 0.23 0.06 -0.01 -0.04 0.70** 0.53 0.43 0.47
(0.69) (0.70) (0.71) (0.70) (0.35) (0.40) (0.44) (0.45)
bbltt 0.22** 0.20** 0.22** 0.22** 0.23** 0.21** 0.23** 0.23**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Fin. sector supporti,t -0.97*** -0.97*** -0.99*** -0.99*** -0.97*** -0.98*** -0.99*** -1.00***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
∆GDP growtht : f inali,t 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Planned electionsi,t 0.59*** 0.61*** 0.60*** 0.54** 0.55** 0.56**
(0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Fiscal rule indexi,t -0.50* -0.51* -0.38 -0.37
(0.29) (0.29) (0.35) (0.34)
Fiscal councili,t -0.23 0.46
(0.56) (0.53)
sgp f inali,t | EMUi,t = 1 1.73** 1.73** 1.80** 1.83** 1.81** 1.70** 1.86** 1.83**
(0.73) (0.73) (0.74) (0.73) (0.72) (0.72) (0.75) (0.74)
Observations 258 258 258 258 221 221 221 221
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Period 2001-12 2001-12 2001-12 2001-12 2002-12 2002-12 2002-12 2002-12
R2 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.69
F-test excluded instr. 43.34 43.00 40.60 37.20 29.85 34.70 31.40 29.11
Regressions include country FE and year dummies; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. sgp and sgp ∗EMU are
instrumented using the predicted values from a probit regression, see section 2.4. In columns 1-3, Current accountt−1i,t , Cur-
rent accountt−1i,t−1, Output gap
t−1
i,t and second and third powers of the lagged 4-year average of the budget balance serve as
exogenous instruments. In columns 5-8, instruments are the same, but lagged one additional period. *** significant at 1%,
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
